Days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Xi Jinping declared a “” partnership with Vladimir Putin. At the one-year anniversary of the invasion, Xi’s diplomatic and military engagements display , despite his recent gestures to broker peace.

This week, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited Beijing on a three-day trip, in a move that many in the West . Austin Ramzy and Ann M. Simmons from The Wall Street Journal reported on : 

Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Moscow’s closest ally, sought to cement the partnership between their two nations as Minsk seeks more help for its sanctions-hit economy while endorsing Beijing’s efforts to cast itself as a peacemaker in the Ukraine war.

[…] On Wednesday, while sitting down for talks with Mr. Xi, Mr. Lukashenko praised Beijing’s efforts on Ukraine and stated his commitment to supporting China’s proposal on international security, which he has earlier called a “new and original initiative that will have far-reaching effects in the world.”

[…] Mr. Lukashenko told Mr. Xi that Belarus was interested in deepening cooperation with China in the sphere of technological development. He proposed the creation of joint ventures in the sphere of machine tools, electric transport and the production of parts for agricultural machinery in both countries. []

Many analysts highlighted the curious timing of the visit. “The only way that Xi would bother to meet with [Lukashenko] right now would be because ,” said Katsiaryna Shmatsina, an expert on Belarusian politics at Virginia Tech university. As Joe Webster wrote in his China-Russia Report on Wednesday, :

Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko’s impromptu visit to Beijing and meetings with General Secretary Xi, other officials, and Chinese corporations may be another indicator that Beijing is increasingly willing to back Putin more overtly, albeit indirectly, by extending assistance to Minsk.

While Lukashenko appears unlikely to enter the conflict as a combatant, there is a significant risk that Beijing could use Minsk as a cutout for economic and potentially even military assistance for Moscow. Minsk is clearly supporting the war (it allowed Russian troops to invade Ukraine from its territory) and is under Western sanctions – but it is not a combatant. The PRC may be trying to exploit Belarus’ nominally neutral status, find fissures in sanctions, and bolster Putin economically or even militarily. []

There have been growing signs of military cooperation between the three countries. In a joint statement released last year, Lukashenko and Xi pledged to “,” and during this week’s visit they agreed to “” on military personnel training and fighting terrorism. Last month, The Wall Street Journal reported that customs records showed “Chinese state-owned defense companies to sanctioned Russian government-owned defense companies.” Last week, Der Spiegel obtained information ostensibly revealing that the :

According to that information, the Russian military is engaged in negotiations with Chinese drone manufacturer Xi’an Bingo Intelligent Aviation Technology over the mass production of kamikaze drones for Russia. The revelations create a new urgency in the debate over possible Chinese military support for Russia.

Bingo has reportedly agreed to manufacture and test 100 ZT-180 prototype drones before delivering them to the Russian Defense Ministry by April 2023. Military experts believe the ZT-180 is capable of carrying a 35- to 50 kilogram warhead.

[…] In a further step, Bingo reportedly plans to deliver components and know-how to Russia so that the country can produce around 100 drones a month on its own.

China apparently already had plans last year to provide the Russian military with much more substantial support than previously known. According to information obtained by DER SPIEGEL, companies under the control of China’s People’s Liberation Army had planned to deliver replacement parts for Russia’s SU-27 fighter jets and other models.

DER SPIEGEL has learned in its reporting that plans had apparently already been made to falsify shipping documents to make the parts for military aircraft appear to be replacement parts for civilian aviation. []

Independent confirmation of this information remains elusive. When reached for comment this week, the Chinese company said: “.” Several days before the Der Spiegel article emerged, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that China was “,” but the U.S. government has not yet publicly provided any specific evidence. Dennis Wilder, a former CIA Deputy Assistant Director for East Asia and the Pacific, suggested on China Talk that : “If I’m the Chinese and I think about artillery shells, here’s what I think: ‘If I don’t put my factory markings on the shells, and I ship them on some of these rail cars that go constantly between China and Russia, how are the Americans going to figure this out? How are they going to know that these are my shells?’”

What is clear, however, is China’s recent diplomatic outreach to autocrats supportive of Russia. Lukashenko’s visit comes just two weeks after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi spent three days in Beijing at Xi’s invitation, marking the . (Iran has Russia with drones and missiles.) Last week, China’s top diplomat , the first by a Chinese official in his role since Russia’s invasion. “There’s been a clear push by Beijing, Moscow, Minsk and Tehran to demonstrate a narrative that says — you can sanction us all you want, and it doesn’t matter,’” said Raffaello Pantucci, a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in London.

The Chinese government has attempted to project an interest in ending the war. On the anniversary of the Russian invasion last week, China released a that “.” The paper, which elaborated on the CCP’s standard talking points about the “Ukraine crisis,” was widely viewed as being . Nonetheless, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed a desire to , who has yet to meet—or even hold a phone call—with Zelensky, despite the Ukrainian government’s . Xi’s reticence has , especially as he prepares to meet Putin in Moscow this spring. As Giacomo Bruni and Ilaria Carrozza argued in The Diplomat, :  

In the end, the position paper predictably offers nothing new in terms of its rhetoric. China continues to walk the fine line between its support for Russia and its attempts at not deteriorating its already fraught relations with Western countries; it repeats ad nauseam the same points that Beijing always expresses internationally, including respect for state sovereignty and international law; and most importantly it does not advance any concrete or practical solution to the conflict. The paper’s main objective rather seems to appease the West and keep at bay some of the criticism for China’s inaction and continued support for Putin. []